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Equity, International Cooperation, and Global Public Health: Use of the Common but
Differentiated Responsibilities Principle in the Fight against COVID-19
By Maïa-Oumeïma Hamrouni, Eric Canal Forgues Alter1

Abstract
During pandemics, in which harm is universal, states find themselves under an
obligation to cooperate within a global solidarity framework. However, because they do not
have the same set of capabilities, their obligations should be differentiated and based on equity
and distributive justice. As an effective tool of States’ foreign policy, health diplomacy is being
used by developing countries according to different priorities and interests. After a few months
of relative calm, COVID-19 still poses a major challenge for African and Middle Eastern
economies and societies where the vaccination rates are low across the board with healthcare
systems in poor shape. If some Gulf countries can be considered exceptions due to active
lockdowns, mobility restrictions, and considerable testing, their engagement abroad to help
contain the pandemic, especially in North Africa, shows that, if the spirit of cooperation and
justice is well taken care of at the regional level, this is not the case at the international level,
where global health cooperation would clearly benefit from the application of a type of
differentiated treatment such as the one provided by the Common but Differentiated
Responsibilities (CBDR) principle.
Keywords: Health diplomacy, Vaccines, CBDR, Principle, Cooperation
Introduction
Contrary to a global public good2, a so-called “global public harm3” is linked to a
damage and not to the consumption of a good. To constitute a global public harm, there must
be, first, a non-rivalry in the infringement; the damage to an individual or a particular area does
not prevent another person or geographical zone from being affected. Second, a non-exclusion
in the infringement: no person can be immune from a damage. Harms are universal.
In a period of pandemics, when a global public good such as public health4 is threatened
by a transborder infectious disease, human survival depends on the capacity of states to shape
or restore a common well-being. The interconnectedness of health systems requires a global
response and a full cooperation of states. As mentioned by Parmet:

1

Dr. Maïa-Oumeïma HAMROUNI is Assistant Professor of Law, Sorbonne University Abu Dhabi, and Eric
CANAL FORGUES ALTER is Dean and Professor of International Law and Diplomacy, Anwar Gargash
Diplomatic Academy, Abu Dhabi.
2 Global Public Goods are non-rival and non-excludable: one country’s enjoyment of a good does not affect its
use by others and once produced, no country can be excluded from sharing its benefits. This definition is an
extension of the notion of “collective consumption goods” by P. SAMUELSON. See Paul A. SAMUELSON, “The
Pure Theory of Public Expenditure”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 36, n4, 1954, pp. 387-389.
See also, Inge KAUL, Isabelle GRUNBERG, and Marc STERN (eds.), Global Public Goods: International
Cooperation in the 21st Century, New York, Oxford University Press, 1999, 546 p.
3 Inge KAUL, Isabelle GRUNBERG, and Marc STERN, “Defining Global Public Goods”, in Inge KAUL, Isabelle
GRUNBERG, and Marc STERN (eds.), Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21 st Century, op.cit.
pp. 2-19.
4 Jeremy YOUDE, “Global Public Goods, Cooperation, and Health”, in Biopolitical Surveillance and Public Health
in International Politics, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp. 41-61.
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“(…) infectious epidemics show that the health of an individual
depends, to a great degree, on the health of others. (…) Likewise,
humanity has long understood that an individual’s ability to protect him
or herself from disease was limited. An individual’s risk of becoming ill
depended in uncertain ways on steps that the community took and the
environment and conditions in which the individual lived. Indeed,
human experience with infectious diseases has long made clear the
importance of collective action in preserving and protecting the health
populations5”.
Faced with the threat of global damage, states find themselves under an obligation to cooperate
within a “compulsory” or global solidarity framework because “global health is in every
nation’s interest”6. Solidarity demands states’ and other international actors’ universal and fair
participation.
States having different sets of capabilities. Developed and developing countries,
however, cannot be considered alike to prevent, reduce, and control a pandemic. In other words,
if all states have the same responsibility to prevent damages and participate in international
response measures aimed at addressing health problems, their obligations should be
differentiated and, for reasons of effectiveness, based on equity and distributive justice.
From previous outbreaks, such as the H1N1 influenza pandemic, or the current COVID-19
crisis, we already know that to put an end to a pandemic, the production of vaccines at scale is
not enough. Varied ethical, public health, economic, and other diplomatic considerations are
at stake. Fair and equitable access being the bottom line to fight a global infection, the key
questions evolve around countries’ access to vaccines, distribution schedule, and allocation of
quantities.
Global Cooperation: Reality or Fiction?
To avoid “vaccine nationalism, or a ‘my country first approach’7”, international
cooperation is needed to accelerate the development and production of pharmaceutical
products (COVID tests, treatments, and vaccines) necessary to fight the SARS-CoV-2 infection
and ensure their equitable distribution among countries. This is clearly reaffirmed by United
Nations General Assembly Resolution 74/274 of April 20208, which also underlined the major
role that the World Health Organization (WHO) can play in proposing options towards the
coordination of international efforts and measures to fight the pandemic. In that regard,
Resolution 74/274 advocates:
“including approaches to rapidly scaling manufacturing and
strengthening supply chains that promote and ensure fair, transparent,
equitable, efficient and timely access to and distribution of preventive
tools, laboratory testing, reagents and supporting materials, essential
5

Wendy E. PARMET, Populations, Public Health, and Law, Washington D.C., Georgetown University Press,
2008, p. 11.
6 Lawrence O. GOSTIN, “Global Health Law Governance”, Emory International Law Review, vol. 22, 2008, p.
39.
7 Thomas J. BOLLYKY and Chad P. BOWN, “The Tragedy of Vaccine Nationalism. Only Cooperation Can End
the Pandemic”, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2020. Available at:
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-07-27/vaccine-nationalism-pandemic.
8 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 74/274: International Cooperation to Ensure Global Access to
Medicines, Vaccines and Medical Equipment to Face COVID-19, New York, United Nations, 20 April 2020,
A/RES/74/274, https://undocs.org/fr/A/RES/74/274.

https://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws/vol23/iss3/8

107

Hamrouni and Canal Forgues Alter: Equity, International Cooperation, and Global Public Health: Use

medical supplies, new diagnostics, drugs and future COVID-19
vaccines, with a view to making them available to all those in need, in
particular in developing countries”.
Access to Covid-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator
Covid-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator, a tool developed by the World Health
Organization, the European Commission, and France, is a direct response to this challenge.
This global, limited in time, collaboration brings together governments, scientists and academic
researchers, pharmaceutical manufacturers, philanthropists, and global health organizations.
Led by the WHO, the initiative rests on three pillars: Vaccines, Diagnostics, and Therapeutics,
and is supported by a Health Systems Connector (HSC) and a country Allocation and Access
workstream9.
The Vaccines component, known as COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access Facility or
COVAX, was established by the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI),
Gavi – the Vaccine Alliance, and the WHO. Its purpose is to combat the disease by acting as a
platform supporting research, development, and manufacturing of the widest possible range of
vaccines.
This pillar also aims at driving down the prices of products between governments by
pooling governments’ buying power to avoid competition. In regrouping their forces, states
can invest in factories and thus share the risks and benefits of research and development
processes. Consequently, self-financing countries (those who participate in the mechanism)
maximize their chances to develop vaccines faster, increase production capacity, and secure
early access to products for all. Additionally, with UNICEF as a key vaccine delivery partner,
COVAX aims to ensure their fair distribution.
Within COVAX, the mechanism for allocating doses combines the basic principles of
fairness and equity and is devised in two stages10.
The first stage emphasizes fairness: vaccine doses are allocated proportionally, and
participating countries receive them according to a gradual allocation scheme. Countries are
first given doses to cover 3% of their population (the priority goes to workers involved in health
and social care work) and then additional doses in tranches to cover 20% of their population.
The second one is based on the principle of equity to take into account differences in
risk profiles across countries. Depending on countries’ needs and global vulnerability,
additional volumes can be delivered. In this case, proportional allocation is replaced by
weighted allocation. This mechanism is in sync with the values framework for the allocation
and prioritization of COVID-19 vaccination established by the WHO Strategic Advisory Group
of Experts on Immunization (SAGE) which has delineated six core principles to guide the
distribution of vaccine doses: human well-being, equal respect, global equity, national equity,
reciprocity, and legitimacy11.
Special attention is paid to low- and middle-income countries. A separate funding
mechanism launched by the Vaccine Alliance, the Gavi COVAX Advanced Market
Commitment (AMC), is to ensure access to COVID-19 vaccines. Due to their lack resources to
9

World Health Organization, What is the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator, how is it structured
and how does it work?. Version of 6 April 2021. Available at: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/whatis-the-access-to-covid-19-tools-(act)-accelerator-how-is-it-structured-and-how-does-it-work.
10 World Health Organization, WHO Concept for Fair Access and Equitable Allocation of COVID-19 Health
Products, September 2020. Available at: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/fair-allocation-mechanismfor-covid-19-vaccines-through-the-covax-facility.
11 World Health Organization, WHO SAGE Values Framework for the Allocation and Prioritization of COVID19 Vaccination, September 2020. Available at: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/who-sage-valuesframework-for-the-allocation-and-prioritization-of-covid-19-vaccination.

Published by Virtual Commons - Bridgewater State University, 2022

108

Journal of International Women's Studies, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [2022], Art. 8

buy adequate quantities of vaccines, these countries have reduced negotiating capacities with
the pharmaceutical industries, and limited possibilities to establish and secure bilateral
agreements with manufacturers. Through COVAX AMC, fragile states can nevertheless
participate in the COVAX Facility as “funded countries” through official development
assistance, private sector donations, or philanthropists.
While COVAX illustrates states’ commitment to find a common solution to a global
problem, its efficiency is being questioned.
A Semblance of Fairness
If the COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access Facility was designed to be fair and equitable,
it does not only respond to a pure Rawlsian logic of distributive justice. In its first stage,
proportional vaccine allocation is linked to demographical concerns and not to states’ health
needs or capacity to respond to the pandemic. In particular, the different impacts of COVID19 on countries are not considered. By treating different emergency situations equally, fairness
might not be achieved. Vaccines should be allocated according to the severity of situations and
not based on strict equality.
The Fair Priority Model developed by researchers in ethics and philosophy and based
on moral considerations appears more pragmatic. Their progressive approach comprises three
steps: reducing the number of premature deaths, reducing social and economic impairments,
and reducing community transmission12. Allocation of vaccine doses is calculated for each
stage according to the following indicators: the standard expected years of life lost, the poverty
gap and gross general income, and the transmission rate.
Morally more acceptable, this solution does not however always accord with states’
interest and, to be successful, the COVAX Facility needs the largest possible involvement of
participants13. The proportional allocation scheme is certainly justified by political reasons. A
targeted distribution could discourage high-income countries (HICs) to participate in the
COVAX Facility. This in turn would further reduce the chances of less wealthy countries to
receive vaccines14.
Another concession to ensure the participation of wealthier countries also calls into
question the fairness of the mechanism. In the original scheme, once validated by health
authorities, vaccines were to be distributed in an undifferentiated manner. This principle was
bypassed when GAVI created another way for self-financing countries to participate in the
COVAX Facility through an Optional Purchase Agreement. The participants can now choose
to opt out from receiving a particular vaccine without endangering their ability to receive other
products. This amounts to set up a differentiated treatment based on a double standards
approach. Developed countries have the luxury of choosing their vaccines since they have the
financial capacity “to pay a higher proportion of the total cost per dose upfront, making a down
payment of US$ 3.10 per dose and a risk-sharing guarantee of US$ 0.40 per dose15”. In other
words, they can afford the vaccines with the highest rates of protection at the expense of the
lowest income countries.
12

Ezekiel J. EMANUEL, Govind PERSAD, Adam KERN et al., “An Ethical Framework for Global Vaccine
Allocation”, Science, vol. 369, Issue 6509, September 2020, pp. 1309-1312.
13 David MCADAMS, Kaci K. MCDADE, Osondu OGBUOJI et al., “Incentivising Wealthy Nations to participate
in the COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access Facility (COVAX0: A Game Theory Perspective”, BMJ Global
Health, vol. 5, Issue 11, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh-2020-003627.
14 For a comparison between schemes of allocation, see Siddhanth SHARMA, Nisrin KAWA, and Apoorva
GOMBER, “WHO’s Allocation Framework for COVAX: is it fair?”, J Med Ethics Epub, vol. 0, 2021, pp.1-5.
DOI: 10.1136/medethics-2020-107152.
15 Seth BERKLEY, COVAX Explained, GAVI, 3 September 2020, https://www.gavi.org/vaccineswork/covaxexplained.
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A Persistence of Individualistic Behaviors
Despite the allocation scheme, COVAX faces competition from wealthier countries for
securing preferential and priority access to vaccines. Many HICs have concluded bilateral
agreements in advance to purchase directly abundant quantities of vaccines from
manufacturers. This, inevitably, reduced the number of available doses for the COVAX
mechanism.
By August 2020, according to the Duke University Launch and Scale Speedometer, the
United States had already entered seven bilateral deals for more than 800 million doses, enough
to vaccinate 138.6% of its population and the United Kingdom had concluded five bilateral
deals to procure 270 million doses, sufficient to vaccinate 224.4% of its population. By June
2021, the USA secured 1.21 billion doses equivalent to 199.5% of its population and the UK
secured 517 million doses for 409.2% of its population16.
While participating in the COVAX Facility, other states increased their chances of
obtaining vaccines by clinching deals with pharmaceutical industries. For instance, European
Union Member States, which are part of the COVAX Facility, benefited from the advance
purchase agreement negotiated by the European Commission and by the Inclusive Vaccine
Alliance (IVA) gathering France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. By June 2021, the
European Union secured 2.79 billion doses through deals made with six companies which have
the capacity to vaccinate 333.5% of its population17. This regional cooperation weakens
international solidarity and can only reinforce criticisms against the European Union for its
handling of the pandemic crisis18.
Beyond the threat to global solidarity, such behaviors appear counterproductive in
contributing to the worsening of the pandemic. The only way to roll out this global health crisis
is to halt virus transmission by achieving herd immunity. This can only be accomplished by
leaving no one behind through global access to vaccines at the same time.
Such behaviors illustrate wealthier states’ skepticism about the reliability of the COVAX
Facility for the deployment of vaccines. By satisfying their own national needs and protecting
their own citizens, the mechanism has become a residual assistance tool to less developed
countries. The various pledges of money and surplus doses by G7 countries at the Cornwall
summit in June 2021 are an almost perfect but sad illustration of a shifting approach.
An Inoperative Distribution
Practical issues prevent a fair distribution of vaccines, especially in poor countries. The
lack of health infrastructures and logistical means for the safe storage of products, such as coldchain infrastructure, prevent them to attain herd immunity any time soon. Several African
States have not been able to administer the vaccines received (The Democratic Republic of
Congo, South Africa) and some have even been forced to destroy (Malawi, South Sudan) or
return them before the expiry date19.

16

Duke Global Health Innovation Center. Launch and Scale Speedometer, 2021, Duke University. Available at:
https://launchandscalefaster.org/covid-19/vaccineprocurement.
17 Ibid.
18 Goran ILIK and Vesna SHAPKOSKI, “Coherence on Trial: The Coronavirus Outbreak as a Critical Test for the
European Union”, Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs, vol. 24, n4, 2020, pp. 25-43. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.33067/SE.4.2020.2.
19 Peter MWAI, “COVID-19 Vaccines: Why Some African States Can’t use Their Vaccines?”, BBC Reality
Check, 8 June 2021. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/56940657.
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As vaccine doses are a limited resource, it is necessary to prioritize countries according
to their capacities or readiness to use vaccines to avoid any waste of products and maximize
the chances of obtaining results in other countries. However, this approach goes against the
principle of global equity on which the COVAX Facility rests. To avert any more
discrimination, the WHO should upgrade its assistance to the poorest countries in the
implementation of vaccine infrastructures20.
While the COVAX Facility is already seen by the richest countries as a mechanism of
assistance to developing countries, its inability to fulfill its objectives vis-à-vis the low- and
middle-income countries reduces its usefulness even further. It appears from the above that the
COVAX Facility suffers from uncertainties that hamper its effectiveness. It also reflects a
“failure of moral imagination21” in the global health governance. The target of distributing 2.3
billion doses of vaccines to protect high-risk populations around the world by early 2022
sounds like wishful thinking and seems out of reach under current conditions.
Expansion of Health Diplomacy: An Interested Assistance
As accurately described by David P. Fidler, health diplomacy refers to the ability to
respond to health concerns and to the capability of states to use medical levers to serve national
interests, while extending their geopolitical influence22, as an instrument of soft power23. The
latter approach was notably developed in the 1970s by Peter Bourne, Special Assistant to the
President for Health Issues during the Carter administration, when he urged the United States
to give greater consideration to medicine and health in international relations. He stated that:
“Certain humanitarian issues, especially health, can be the basis for
establishing a dialog and bridging diplomatic barriers because they
transcend traditional and more volatile and emotional concerns. Medical
diplomacy can be the vehicle by which channels of communication can
be established between nations when international relations are strained
or severed. (…) Medical diplomacy can take many forms and, since this
represents a relatively little used area in United States diplomacy,
alternatives need to be carefully evaluated24”.
This concept has since matured to become an effective tool of state foreign policy. If, in the
past, it had been the privilege of only the most advanced countries, developing countries saw
the COVID-19 crisis as an opportunity to use health diplomacy to play a more active role in
the international arena, among them China, India, and Russia with—obviously—different
priorities and interests.
China

20

Marc ECCLESTON-TURNER and Harry UPTON, “International Collaboration to Ensure Equitable Access to
Vaccines for COVID-19: The ACT-Accelerator and the COVAX Facility”, The Milbank Quarterly, vol. 0, n 0,
2021, pp. 1-24. DOI: 10.1111/1468-0009.12503.
21 Laurence O. GOSTIN and R. ARCHER, “The Duty of States to Assist Other States in Need: Ethics, Human
Rights, and International Law”, Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, vol. 35, 2007, p. 531.
22 David P. FIDLER, “Health Diplomacy”, in Andrew F. COOPER, Jorge HEINE and Ramesh THAKUR (eds.), The
Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 691-707.
23 Joseph S. NYE JR., “Hard, Soft, and Smart Power”, in Andrew F. COOPER, Jorge HEINE and Ramesh THAKUR
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 559-574.
24 Peter G. BOURNE, “A Partnership for International Health Care”, Public Health Reports, vol.93, n°2, MarchApril 1978, p. 121.
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President Xi Jinping announced in 2013 an important shift in his foreign policy with
the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, collectively referred to
as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI is considered as an ambitious international
investment program dedicated to strengthening China’s connectivity by building ports, rails,
and land infrastructures to link Asia, Europe, and Africa. This investment strategy has been
extended to other sectors, such as science and technology, energy, culture, tourism, and health.
One of the objectives of the BRI is to enhance “people to people band”. To that effect,
China’s proposal is to:
“…strengthen cooperation (…) on epidemic information sharing, the
exchange of prevention and treatment technologies and the training of
medical professionals and improve (…) capability to jointly address
public health emergencies. [China] will provide medical assistance and
emergency medical aid to relevant countries and carry out practical
cooperation in maternal and child health, disability rehabilitation, and
major infectious diseases including AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria.
[China] will also expand cooperation on traditional medicine25”.
This strategy was further developed by different health-themed forums26 and through a
Memorandum of Understanding with the WHO setting up a joint Health Silk Road (HSR) in
200727. Due to the Coronavirus pandemic and related economic difficulties, Beijing has since
modified the BRI priorities. The Health Silk Road, now the spearhead of its foreign policy, has
shifted “from a venue for sharing medical knowledge to a route for aid delivery28”.
At the start of the crisis, China was criticized for not promptly reporting infections,
contributing to the spread of the disease. After regaining control of the sanitary situation on its
territory, Beijing sought to improve its reputation as a decisive actor in the fight against the
virus and not, or no longer, as the source of the disease.
Due to the lack of health governance by world actors such as the United States and the
European Union, China tried to present itself as a responsible and committed leader, concerned
about the common well-being and wishing to promote international cooperation29.

25

National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Commerce,
Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21 st Century Maritime Silk Road, 28 March
2015. Document available at: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1249618.shtml.
26 For example, the China-Central and Eastern European Countries Health Ministers Forum (2015), the ChinaArab States Health Cooperation Forum (2015), the China-ASEAN Health Cooperation Forum (2016), and the
Belt and Road High-Level Meeting for Health Cooperation: Towards a Health Silk Road (2017).
27 An BAIJIE, “WHO, China Sign Pact Establishing ‘Health Silk Road’”, China Daily, 19 January 2017.
Available at: https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017wef/2017-01/19/content_27993857.htm. See also,
WHO, News Release, New Vision and Strengthened Partnership for WHO and China, 21 August 2017
https://www.who.int/news/item/21-08-2017-new-vision-and-strengthened-partnership-for-who-and-china.
28 Cao JIAHAN, “Toward a Health Silk Road. China’s Proposal for Global Health Cooperation”, China
Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, vol. 6, n1, p. 25.
29 Anna KOBIERECKA and Michal M. KOBIERECHI, “Coronavirus diplomacy: Chinese Medical Assistance and
its Diplomatic Implications”, International Politics, 2021, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00273-1.
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Commentators even suggested that Chinese health diplomacy during the pandemic was a way
to ascertain the hegemon status30 of the country and to reshape global order31.
In that spirit, and having quickly succeeded in controlling the spread of the Coronavirus,
Beijing showed a great interest in offering other countries advice and assistance. As Italy was
in a critical situation, the Chinese President called its Prime Minister in March 2020 to assure
him of his support, further indicating that “in the spirit of solidarity, China will send additional
medical teams and experts to Italy and provide medical supplies and other assistance to the
best of its ability32”. President Xi Jinping also affirmed that China was “ready to work with
Italy to contribute to international cooperation on epidemic control and to build the ‘Health
Silk Road’33”.
With the spread of the virus, China has been able to play a major role as one of the
largest suppliers of medical equipment since 44% of the world’s exports of face masks
originate from China in 201834.
From providing aid and assistance to other countries (mask diplomacy) China is now
focusing on vaccines delivery (vaccine diplomacy)35.
Mask diplomacy is the strategy led by China to deliver large quantities of medical
equipment (testing kits, ventilators, masks, personal protective equipment (PPE), and other
medical resources. Aiming to cultivate friendships and to “win hearts and minds36”, Beijing
acted like a benevolent actor and provided aid and assistance everywhere (Asia, Africa, Europe,
Latin-American Countries), especially to developing countries: millions of facemasks and test
kits were sent worldwide. China also sent medical teams and experts to support local initiatives
to combat the virus. China thus emerged as a “high-profile humanitarian aid provider37” and
did not hesitate to stage its donations for political communication purposes and to relay
governments’ testimonies of gratitude38. While appealing publicly to multilateral cooperation,
this strategy was pursued throughout the whole vaccine research and development phase.
As to vaccine diplomacy, the starting point was the announcement by President Xi
Jinping on May 18, 2020, in a speech to the WHO, of a call to recognize the future vaccine as

30

Priya GAUTTAM, Bawa SINGH, and Jaspal KAUR, “COVID-19 and Chinese Global Health Diplomacy:
Geopolitical Opportunity for China’s Hegemony?”, Millennial Asia, vol. 11, Issue 3, 2020, pp. 318-340.
31 Kurt M. CAMPBELL and Rush DOSHI, “The Coronavirus Could Reshape Global Order”, Foreign Affairs,
Mach 2020. Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-03-18/coronavirus-could-reshapeglobal-order.
32 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, News Release, President Xi Jinping Talked
with Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte over the Phone, 16 March 2020. Available at:
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1756887.shtml.
33 Ibid.
34 Andreas FUCHS et al., “Mask Wars: China’s Exports of Medical Goods in Times of COVID-19”, cege
Discussion Papers n 398, University of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic
Development Research (cege), Göttingen. Document available at:
http://wwwuser.gwdg.de/~cege/Diskussionspapiere/DP398.pdf.
35 Mercator Institute for China Studies, “China’s Vaccine Diplomacy. Partnering for Trials in at least 16
countries worldwide”, 8 October 2020. Available at: https://merics.org/en/short-analysis/chinas-vaccinediplomacy-partnering-trials-least-16-countries-worldwide.
36 Nicholas R. SMITH and Tracey FALLON, “An Epochal Moment? The COVIS-19 Pandemic and China’s
International Order Building, World Affairs, vol. 183, n3, pp. 235-255. DOI: 10.1177/0043820020945395.
37 Priya GAUTTAM, Bawa SINGH, and Jaspal KAUR, “COVID-19 and Chinese Global Health Diplomacy:
Geopolitical Opportunity for China’s Hegemony?”, op.cit., p. 325.
38 Bartosz KOWALSKI, “China’s Mask Diplomacy in Europe: Seeking Foreign Gratitude and Domestic
Stability”, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 2021, pp. 1-18. Document available at:
https://doi.org/10.1177/18681026211007147.
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a “global public good” to ensure its “accessibility and affordability in developing countries39”.
The call strongly contrasted with the letter sent the same day by President Trump to the WHO
threatening to permanently freeze its funding and to reconsider U.S membership. In pursuance
of the HSR discourse on the need to work for international cooperation, China also joined the
COVAX Facility.
After China’s health authorities authorized several homegrown COVID-19 vaccines for
general use, the United Arab Emirates was the first country to approve in 2020 the Chinese’s
vaccine Sinopharm. Bahrain, Egypt, and Morocco quickly followed suit, increasing Chinese
influence in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region40.
When two Chinese vaccines (Sinopharm and Sinovac) were added to the WHO’s Emergency
Use Listing (meaning that they passed quality, safety, and efficacy requirements and are
following manufacturing and quality management standards), allowing their distribution in the
COVAX Facility and increasing overall access to products, it was considered as a welcome
recognition of the effectiveness of Chinese vaccines, long criticized for their lack of
transparency on scientific data.
China continues to make every effort to carry out its strategy to ensure its leadership
position in the fight against the virus. By June 2021, “China has provided more than 350 million
doses of vaccines to the international community, including vaccine assistance to over 80
countries and vaccine exports to more than 40 countries41” with a total of 25 million doses
donated42. China has also committed 10 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines to the COVAX
Facility and has announced a donation of 200,000 doses of vaccines and USD 1 million to the
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugee in the Near East to help the
Palestinians43.
Chinese vaccine diplomacy is not limited to the supply of vaccines. Transfer of
technologies and establishment of partnerships are also doing their part. The United Arab
Emirates is on its way to manufacture and distribute the Sinopharm vaccine44, and Morocco
plans to do the same to make it accessible to the African continent45.
India
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With the adoption of the Patent Act46 in 1970, India has become one of the most
important generic pharmaceutical industries47, supplying affordable medicines to a large
number of countries. From the beginning of the COVID-19 outbreak, the country decided to
participate in the global effort to guarantee access to vaccines to all in developing vaccine
diplomacy. Known as being the “pharmacy of the world48”, India has the material capacity to
produce at low cost “over 3 billion coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) vaccine doses
annually49”.
The Vaccine Maitri policy or the Vaccine Friendship policy is the public diplomacy
initiative of the Indian government to provide vaccines to many countries. To that effect, Indian
manufacturers signed exclusive license agreements with foreign factories to produce
considerable quantities of COVID-19 vaccines. For example, in June 2020, the Serum Institute
of India, the world’s largest vaccine manufacturer, reached a licensing agreement with
AstraZeneca to supply one billion doses of the Oxford’s University vaccine for low- and
middle-income countries.
India has also worked to consolidate its role of provider of humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief as mentioned by Prime Minister Narendra Modi:
“We have always prided ourselves as the first responder in our region –
a friend in need. Be it earthquakes, cyclones, or any other natural or
human-made crisis, India has responded with speed and solidarity. In
our joint fight against COVID, we have extended medical and other
assistance to over 150 countries. We also helped create a SAARC [South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] COVID emergency fund
in our neighborhood50”.
If the Indian government is committed to providing vaccine doses to developing countries, it
also favors regional diplomacy51 distribution. In conformity with its Neighborhood First
foreign policy, priority is given to South Asian neighbors. To ensure political stability, which
is a fundamental condition for the development of the region,52 and strengthen India’s relations
with its geographical environment, the government exports vaccines free of cost to Bhutan,
Maldives, Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan.
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Health diplomacy is also useful to push back Chinese claims to regional dominance and thwart
the Belt and Road Initiative53 by securing the loyalty of close neighbors.
Those plans have since been reviewed following the deterioration of the sanitary situation
in the country. India seems to have toned down, at least for now, its regional and global policy.
It does not mean that the country’s ambitions and reach out policy cannot return once the
epidemics will be controlled nationally.
Russia
Russia has adopted a different “inner” approach in using health diplomacy to serve its
own political and economic interests, in particular to call off Western sanctions though its
appeals to international solidarity and cooperation. In a letter to the UN Secretary-General
Antonio Guterres, eight countries54, among them Russia, requested in March 2020 the lifting
of unilateral sanctions imposed on them to fight the pandemic. They argued that such
restrictions were hindering their ability to effectively combat the disease and had a disastrous
impact on the economic and humanitarian situation55.
Secretary-General Guterres obliged in the following terms:
“sanctions imposed on countries should be waived to ensure access to
food, essential supplies and access to COVID-19 tests and medical
support. This is time for solidarity not exclusion56”.
Without evoking the sanctions, the UN General Assembly Resolution 74/270 Global solidarity
to fight the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic57 only renewed its commitment
“to help people and societies in special situations, especially the weakest and most vulnerable”.
Russia threw itself headlong in the vaccine race to regain its reputation as a competitive
leader in scientific research. Its efforts paid off when national authorities, the first in their class,
approved, on 11 August 2020, a COVID-19 vaccine. Called Sputnik in reference to the firstever artificial Earth satellite launched by the Soviet Union on 4 October 1957, Russia yearned
to reiterate the exploit.
In the eyes of the international community, despite the fact that the vaccine was
developed by the Gamaleya National Centre of Epidemiology and Microbiology, one of
Russia’s most renewed scientific institutes, the announcement was clearly premature. Third
phase trials had not been carried out and the scientific community and foreign governments
pinpointed the lack of data transparency. The Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) had to
launch a major media campaign to convince the international community of the effectiveness
of the vaccine.
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In reaction, Russia preferred to address the European Union shortcomings towards its
neighbors by distributing vaccine doses to Eastern Europe and the Balkans. It further stressed
the great effectiveness of the national vaccine in comparison to those of the West, the “best in
the world” according to President Putin. The RDIF relayed this information in advertising its
97.8% efficacy against COVID cases and 100% efficacy against severe cases of COVID in
UAE58 as well as its high 94.3% efficacy and high safety profile during the vaccination
campaign in Bahrain59. For Krill Dimitriev, CEO of the RDIF:
“Sputnik V complies with the highest healthcare standards while
demonstrating safety and efficacy during the vaccination in UAE.
Sputnik is one of the best COVID vaccines in the world as confirmed by
data from Argentina, Serbia, San-Marino, Bahrain, Hungary, Mexico,
and other countries. Administering the Russian vaccine helps create
durable immunity among the population and provides for lifting the
restrictions and returning to normal life”.
Since then, Russia has been helping developing countries to obtain vaccine doses, especially
in Latin America and Africa. Sputnik V is now approved by 67 States.
The Kremlin also favored the foreign production of the vaccine in Argentina, China, India,
the Republic of Korea, and Belarus among several other countries. Pending the approval of the
vaccine for distribution in Europe by the European Medicines Agency, deals have already been
concluded with the RDIF to launch the production of Sputnik V. The Swiss pharmaceutical
company Adienne Pharma & Biotech SA became the first Europe-based manufacturer to sign
such agreements followed by companies from Spain, Italy, France, and Germany. Two EU
Member States nevertheless stood out. Hungary and Slovakia have already granted emergency
approval and began inoculation of the vaccine.
A peer-reviewed analysis in the prestigious medical journal The Lancet and confirming the
safety and efficacity60 of the Sputnik V vaccine has been largely used by the RDIF as a tool of
communication. The marketing campaign appears to be working since more than 40 states have
authorized the vaccine since the publication. According to commentators, however, the
importance given to such reports cannot replace official regulatory authorities’ analysis61.
Cooperation to Rethink: The Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities
Against the Pandemics
International cooperation through the COVAX mechanism, or exercised by states’
health diplomacy, is not up to expectations. It is more urgent than ever to find ways to revitalize
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collaboration efforts towards greater efficiency. The central question remains whether states
have a duty to show real solidarity in times of crisis, especially when public health is at stake.
In the United Nations Millennium Declaration62, and in addition to their separate
responsibilities to individual societies, it is expressly recognized that heads of states and
governments “have a collective responsibility to uphold the principles of human dignity,
equality and equity at the global level” and “have a duty therefore to all the world’s people,
especially the most vulnerable”. It is further affirmed that:
“Global challenges must be managed in a way that distributes the costs
and burdens fairly in accordance with the principles of equity and social
justice. Those who suffer or who benefit least deserve help from those
who benefit most”.
If the UN Declaration enunciates states’ commitment to cooperate, it is devoid of obligation.
It is more a moral or political duty rather than a legal one. No wonder the same also applies in
matters of public health. The WTO Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
health63 states that:
“(…) while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we
affirm that the agreement can or should be interpreted and implemented
in a manner supportive of WTO members’ right to protect public health
and in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.
In this connection, we reaffirm the right of WTO members to use, to the
full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility
for this purpose”.
While flexibility is accorded to the most vulnerable countries, which evidently do not have
sufficient resources to protect public health, it is only granted in a hortatory manner.
If we assume that international cooperation should move beyond intentions, human
rights law may provide in our view an adequate framework for increased if not mandatory
international cooperation. The well-known “right to life” contains the necessary ideological
and legal grounds which may allow such recognition. In its General Comments, the UN Human
Rights Committee even provides an extensive interpretation of this right in considering it as a
“supreme right from which no derogation is permitted64”, a right “basic to all human rights65”.
Neither the Human Rights Committee, nor the law applicable to human rights explain however
how this cooperation should be exercised. It is therefore essential to continue seeking legal
tools that will permit effective implementation.
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For achieving international cooperation goals, states must not be treated unjustly, and
their own situation should be fully recognized. According to international law, differentiated
treatment grants the necessary equity. In the past, such a concept was used to rebalance
economic relations between states. The first United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) established a system of general preferences applicable to all
developing countries without reciprocity, which was then reproduced in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). By their decision of 25 June 1971 setting up a
“Generalized System of Preferences66”, the Contracting Parties granted a waiver from Article
I of GATT (the most-favored-nation clause). During the Tokyo Round, the Contracting Parties
gave a permanent legal basis to the preferential treatment of developing countries under the
Generalized System of Preferences by Decision L-4903 of 28 November 1979 on the
“Differential and more favorable treatment, reciprocity, and fuller participation of developing
countries”, otherwise known as the Enabling clause. This provision makes the preferential
treatment lawful and authorizes double standards67.
Since then, differentiation has been endorsed in environmental law, where it constitutes
the cornerstone of the climate regime. Formalized for the first time by the United Nations
Declaration on Environment and Development adopted at the Rio Conference in 1992, the
principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR)68 has since been included in
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol of 1997,
the Paris Agreement of 2015, and other environmental treaties.
Because the protection of the environment is of common concern and a global public
good, this principle organizes the cooperation of all States in the fight against climate change
through common but differentiated (because they respond to a justice imperative)
responsibilities.
As responsibilities refer to different national contexts and heterogenous economic
situations in the context of climate change, states must be treated in a differentiated manner
under the principle of equity69. It follows that states have differentiated obligations. Although
responsibilities are only moral in nature, differentiation in obligations is proportional to the
role of States in the environmental degradation and to their financial capacity to fight against
all adverse effects of climate change. This is precisely where the notion of equity comes into
play.
As a global public good, public health meets the same requirements. State participation
must be universal. If a country disassociates itself from the efforts of the international
community, or if it practices a free rider policy and hopes to benefit from the efforts of others
without providing any, then the results would be detrimental to all.
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In accordance with the CBDR principle, richer countries having the financial and
material capacities to fight a health crisis must assist the ones in need to help them comply with
their obligations. In other words:
“with CBDR, it becomes clear that there is a duty placed on the
developed world, or on any nation that has the capacity to help, to ensure
availability of critical life-saving equipment and treatments to those
nations that are in need of the same. They also have a greater
responsibility towards contributing resources to accelerating research
into the coronavirus, finding a treatment, and building a long-term
resilience compared to others70”.
While it seems that this cannot be achieved under the current world health scheme, the COVAX
Facility could have constituted a perfect illustration of an international health cooperation
based on the CBDR principle. Developed States would have had a duty to cooperate adequately
and fairly to the mechanism and vaccine distribution would have been based on a generalized
targeted allocation scheme.
In an interconnected world, when a global public good is concerned, the CBDR should
be applied quasi automatically as one of the most efficient tools to promote and implement
international cooperation. Classic concepts such as cooperation or sovereignty are always
poised to evolve. Faced with serious threats to public goods, sovereignty should be geared
towards a clear “community interest” and not be confined to the endless solitary course it once
enjoyed.
After a few months of relative calm, COVID-19 still poses a major challenge for
African and Middle Eastern countries where the vaccination rates are low across the board with
healthcare systems in poor shape. Several factors might explain why vaccination rates are at
this level. Among them: limited deliveries from the COVAX facility, armed conflicts, other
disease outbreaks, poor health management capacity, and inability of many countries to
purchase doses for economic reasons.
In Libya for instance, the country has received an insufficient mix of Astra Zeneca and
Pfizer vaccines via COVAX, as well as Sputnik and Sinopharm doses. Due to the ongoing
financial crisis, Lebanon has been mostly focused on mitigating the economic effects of the
pandemic and cases have surged with hospitals being unable to treat patients due to the lack of
capacity and oxygen shortages. In August 2021 only, a deal was signed by a Lebanese
pharmaceutical company to produce the vaccine locally. In Tunisia, even if the deadly wave
recently abated, the country has the highest recorded death rate per capita in the Middle East
and North Africa due to low adherence to public health and social measures as well as low
vaccination coverage. The example of Yemen also shows that in conflict zones, rumor and
misinformation can add to already dire situations and the India-produced Covishield, licensed
by AstraZeneca, has reached the country via COVAX in very low quantities. The principle of
CBDR would certainly be of use for those countries in need of health cooperation.
Well-to-do Gulf countries such the United Arab Emirates, who had secured vaccine
supplies early, can be considered as exceptions due to their aggressive response to coronavirus
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cases. Containment, through activity lockdowns, mobility restrictions, and considerable testing
for both residents and foreign visitors, has helped contain the spread of the virus. More
importantly, from the point of view of health cooperation and taking stock of their experience
in the fight against coronavirus, they have helped contain the pandemic in North Africa through
massive vaccine delivery. While this is not intended to strictly reflect the implementation of
the CBDR principle, the spirit of cooperation and justice is well taken care of.
In the Middle East for instance, the health crisis is already a critical test for the region’s
fragile resilience, for MENA economies and societies alike. Countries may want to capitalize
on their innovative policy efforts to improve inclusiveness, sustain welfare provisions, and
promote a structural reform agenda for more open and private sector-led economies, aligned
with the sustainable development goals. Whatever the outcome of these efforts, countries
would be well advised to just not turn a blind eye to already existing principles that can
effectively further international health cooperation.
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